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Much of the discussion of the risks of sovereign debt crises has focused on the issue of 
currency risk (see Dodd and Spiegel, 2005). This has led to the recommendation that 
countries should borrow in their local currency. Yet in the drive to develop local markets, 
many countries are running up domestic debt burdens. Although domestic debt has the 
advantage over foreign debt that it is not subject to a currency mismatch, countries are 
still forced to use scarce budget resources to repay the debt, and if the debt gets overly 
large, a country can run the risk of a debt crisis. There are many reasons that some 
countries have begun to accumulate large domestic debt burdens including financing 
external debt buybacks, sterilizing capital inflows, or financing domestic programs. In 
Indonesia’s case, a costly bailout of the banking system following the 1997 crisis left 
Indonesia saddled with a domestic debt burden.  
 
Although Indonesia had a major sovereign debt crisis in the 1960s, it overcame it by the 
1970s and did not have another sovereign debt problem until the East Asian financial 
crisis erupted in 1997. That regional economic crisis, on top of years of unusually severe 
El Niño drought, was too much and sovereign debt, first external and then domestic, 
again became too great a burden. In part, the debt problem was a familiar one of a sudden 
inability to continue servicing external obligations, reflecting the withdrawal of private 
financial inflows, capital flight and the disproportionate collapse of the rupiah. Yet, 
Indonesia soon also had reason to be concerned about an exploding level of government 
domestic debt. The major aim of this paper is to describe the sequence of events that 
brought about this latter situation and assess the crisis workout policy that was followed 
relative to alternatives that are deemed superior. The latter are analyzed by simulations 
under alternative sets of policies using a comprehensive model of the Indonesian 
economy. 
 
As discussed in the next section, the Indonesian government had in general managed its 
sovereign debt quite well after the 1960s crisis. The trend and management of external 
debt, in particular, remained an unlikely source of serious risk to fiscal or balance-of-
payments sustainability under what were then foreseeable circumstances. But while 
external sovereign debt remained under control, private external debt increased 
substantially during the 1990s. The collapse in 1997-1998 was in a large part due to the 
build-up in private short-term external debt, and external debt renegotiations were 
necessary to give the country financial breathing room. Also at that time, the government 
took on a large amount of private obligations, causing a surge in domestic debt associated 
in particular with the policy to rescue the banking sector initiated in 1998. This put the 
country’s fiscal sustainability into question. While intending to restore the banking 
sector’s intermediation function, the recapitalization program used up an enormous 
amount of resources, equivalent to roughly half of the gross domestic product (GDP). To 
the extent that the problem occurred at the same time that the country failed to generate a 
robust recovery, one wonders whether the two are related. This paper argues that they 
are.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Following the discussions in the next two sections on 
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the evolution of external and domestic debt, results of counterfactual simulations on 




2. ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 
 
Chaotic economic conditions in Indonesia in the 1960s, including a severe foreign debt 
crisis2 and a myriad of structural problems, ended with a change in the political regime 
and, beginning in 1966, a stabilization and rehabilitation program. The new government 
implemented an orthodox economic policy, which succeeded at bringing down the 
inflation rate from a three-digit level to less than 5 percent in 1971. The balance-of-
payments deficit improved, as the ratio of exports to GDP rose from 9 to 15 percent 
during this period, while the import ratio remained stable despite the abolishment of 
quantitative restrictions on imports. The fiscal deficit fell from 6 to 3 percent of GDP, 
and government saving increased. Remarkably, the fall in inflation was accompanied by 
an accelerated GDP growth rate, from negative to a positive 7 percent in 1971.  
One of the main reasons for the improved growth was the inflow of foreign capital in the 
form of loans and foreign investment (mostly in the extractive sector). As early as 1970, 
controls on capital movements were eliminated. This marked the beginning of 
Indonesia’s new policy on foreign capital. Capital inflows were necessary, but due to the 
inflows a huge amount of debt was accumulated.  
 
One reason that new loans were forthcoming, aside from the growing confidence in 
policy management, was the financial breathing room accorded first by debt rescheduling 
and then by the final debt restructuring in 1970. The country was heavily indebted when 
the New Order government came to power in 1966. With the help of other countries 
(particularly Japan), the Indonesian government managed to reschedule its foreign debts 
through the Paris Club in December 1966. At the initiative of the Netherlands, the first 
meeting of a donor consortium (consisting of a group of donor countries, the World 
Bank, and the Asian Development Bank), called the Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia (IGGI), was organized immediately following the debt rescheduling, in 
February 1967. The debt crisis was settled later, however, on the basis of a proposal by 
Dr. Herman Abs, a famous German banker, and approved by the aid consortium.3 The 
debt workout embodied a grant element of 59.9%, a 30-year amortization and no interest 
payments for 15 years (data of the World Bank, as cited by Klein, 1973, p. 20). 
Following the settlement, the IGGI continued to hold annual meetings that determined 
the size and utilization of foreign loans. These IGGI meetings basically shaped 
Indonesia’s policy on external debt. All loans in that era were concessional. 
 
The 1970s would turn out to be a volatile decade, albeit one the country largely steered 
through successfully. One difficult situation was created when oil prices quadrupled in 
1973/74. The state-owned oil company, Pertamina, actively expanded its operations by 
financing investments by borrowing aggressively in international credit markets. Many of 
the operations were unrelated to oil businesses, and economically unjustified. When the 
company finally defaulted in 1975, the central bank took over the debt, resulting in a 
drawdown of foreign reserves. The country’s ability to repay foreign debt was 
                                                 
2 Debt payments due, including arrears, exceeded export earnings. 
3 More precisely, Indonesia rescheduled its Paris Club obligations on December 20, 1966, October 22, 1967 
and October 17, 1968, before its final workout arrangement, agreed on April 24, 1970.  
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consequently put into question. In this context, the advantage of having an Indonesian-
focused policy forum with a friendly approach such as the IGGI became apparent.  
 
Learning from the Pertamina debacle, and in order to reduce external indebtedness, the 
government imposed strict controls on public enterprise borrowing and on the use of 
windfall revenues. This helped improve the country’s overall debt position and reduce the 
debt service ratio.  
 
The oil boom in 1973/74 also led to a real appreciation of the rupiah and a quick reversal 
of the current account balance from surplus to deficit in 1975.4  But as the economy and 
exports continued to grow, the deficit disappeared in 1977. With such a background, 
many were caught by surprise when in late 1978 the government decided to devalue the 
currency by 33.6% against the US dollar, to which it had been pegged in a multiple 
exchange rate system and adopt a managed floating system, in which an effective unified 
rate was established on a controlled basis (floating within 1% either side of the middle 
rate based on a basket of currencies). As a side effect, the policy caused the fiscal burden 
of the debt to rise, as more local currency was needed to repay the debt.  
 
This fiscal effect was contained, however, as the government continued to enforce its so-
called “balanced” budget approach, which had been introduced in 1967. Under this 
principle, there could be a gap between expenditures and revenues, but it had to be 
covered with foreign loans.5 Such borrowing did not create a significant monetary 
disturbance, since the central bank sterilized the inflows. Along with credit controls, this 
played a major role in bringing down the inflation rate. With improved macroeconomic 
conditions and high oil prices, Indonesia’s debt repayment capacity was not in peril. 
 
In addition, Indonesia benefited from the second oil-boom in 1979-1980. The current 
account improved dramatically and the economy grew steadily, until the world recession 
hit in 1982, which caused prices of many commodities to collapse. The country’s terms 
of trade deteriorated, the current account deficit widened, and economic growth became 
negative for the first time since 1966. This led the government to devalue the currency 
again in 1983.6 Unlike the 1978 devaluation, however, this time the fear of a balance-of-
payments crisis was credible. The government began to emphasize efforts to boost non-
oil exports. At the same time, a number of public investments were either delayed or 
postponed, and a tight monetary policy was imposed.  
                                                 
4 The oil ‘boom’ in 1974 caused a ‘Dutch disease’ appreciation in which prices of non-tradables rose 
relative to tradables. However, the government’s agricultural price policy helped to restrain the increase of 
the prices of non-tradable goods. Later, with the improved price of tradables following the devaluation in 
1978, non-oil exports received a strong boost, causing the current account to register a surplus. All these 
factors ameliorated the extent and duration of the ‘Dutch disease’ effect caused during the oil-boom period.  
5 As may be seen from the definition employed, the concept of “balanced” budget was not widely 
understood. The borrowing undertaken, however, played a significant role particularly in the rehabilitation 
and development of infrastructure needed to relieve the existing supply bottlenecks. The balanced budget 
concept had been established through Presidential Decree No. 13/1969. 
6 It was dropped 27.6% against the dollar, with the central bank pledging to continue the managed float, 




The episode was part of a major shift in Indonesian economic policy, as the country 
headed towards a more liberalized economy. The most dramatic policy change was in the 
financial sector. In June of 1983 a major financial deregulation was announced, aimed at 
dismantling the old system of direct monetary control to be replaced by a more indirect 
approach based on reserve management through open market operations (OMO).7  
Optimistic about economic prospects, there was a strong desire to spend on large (mega) 
projects, as a consequence of which more external borrowing was needed. Since state-
owned or state-related enterprises and Japanese private counterparts jointly conducted 
many of the projects, a large portion of the borrowing was in yen and made on a more 
commercial basis. This raised a concern about the country’s capacity to repay the debt.  
 
Pandemonium set in when the economy was hit by double blows in 1986: a plunge in oil 
prices, and a sharp appreciation of the Japanese yen against the US dollar. The first 
reduced the amount of foreign exchange; the latter increased the amount of local currency 
needed to service the yen-denominated debt. At the same time, the current account deficit 
widened. This forced the government to devalue the currency another 31 percent, 
requiring an even larger amount of local currency to service foreign debt.8  The 
coordination of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy became more difficult. The 
government was eventually forced to postpone the implementation of some mega-
projects, although some large public sector investments proceeded.  
 
Another dramatic policy change took place in the banking sector in 1988. The 
government promulgated a policy aimed at increasing bank competition by allowing easy 
entry of new private banks, including foreign bank branches, outside the capital city, 
Jakarta. Along with the effects of the June 1983 reform, the 1988 package brought an 
increased competitiveness to the financial system. As theory warns, however, when 
interest rates surged, it altered the lenders’ incentives and prompted imprudent behaviors 
of the banking sector (Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000). Investment credits going to 
risky sectors rose (adverse selection), the incidence of bailouts in the absence of an 
effective bankruptcy regime increased (moral hazard), and the subsequent banks’ 
franchise values (expected returns) declined. All this occurred in an environment of weak 
bank supervision and weak prudential regulation. However, continued strong economic 
growth suppressed recognition of the urgency of enforcing stronger supervision and 
                                                 
7 An early sign of the government’s intention to reform the financial sector had actually emerged in mid-
1982, when the central bank, Bank Indonesia, cut back on the provision of credits that, for several years, 
had been directed toward activities with low priority. But it was the June-1983 package that produced a 
considerable impact on the financial sector. Practically all credit ceilings were eliminated, resulting in an 
increased degree of flexibility in pricing (interest rate) and quantity (credit). At that point, however, no 
provision was made to ease the entry of competition. The dominance of the state-owned banks, an 
important sign of the country’s financial repression, remained overwhelming. 
8  A relatively extensive trade deregulation was also announced in the same year. Since then, a series of 
reforms in trade and investment were undertaken. As a result, non-oil exports grew at an impressive rate, 
almost tripling from US$5 billion in 1983 to US$14.4 billion in 1990, and their share in total exports 
increased dramatically from 25 percent to 56 percent. Economic growth was strong, reaching more-than 7 
percent, without any serious inflationary pressure (during the reform period, the average growth rate was 





It took less than a year from the start of the 1988 reform for the economy to overheat. By 
1989, GDP growth accelerated to 7.5 percent, non-oil exports grew rapidly, and private 
investment surged (investment boom). In its train, inflation reached 9.4 percent in 1991. 
This adversely affected export competitiveness under the managed exchange rate.9 
Another pressure on the balance of payments came from a greater demand for imports to 
support the boom in investment (non-oil imports grew at an unprecedented rate, i.e., more 
than 31 percent), while the growth of non-oil exports dipped to a one-digit rate. 
Consequently, the current account deficit widened, raising the expectation of devaluation. 
This led to the subsequent series of capital outflows.10  
 
To counter the outflows, the government promulgated a series of trade and investment 
reforms, which worked fairly well. To cool down the economy, a tight money policy was 
implemented, but this did not work well because efforts to control net foreign assets, 
particularly export credits, were in vain (see Azis, 1999).  
 
Meanwhile, an episode of mainly political importance affecting Indonesia’s access and 
terms of aid and official credit arrangements occurred in 1991. The shootings of 
demonstrators in Dili, East Timor, led to a wave of international protests. Initiated by the 
Netherlands, three countries suspended their loans through IGGI. Angered by this move, 
the Indonesian government announced in March 1992 that it would decline all future 
loans from the Netherlands as part of a blanket refusal to link foreign assistance to human 
rights issues. The government also requested that the IGGI be disbanded and that the 
World Bank replace it with a new consortium, the Consultative Group on Indonesia 
(CGI). Japan, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, whose combined 
contribution was around 80 percent of the total IGGI-coordinated assistance, continued to 
pledge their support through the new setting. In the end, no major aid or debt policy 
change occurred following the incident.  
 
The economy continued to boom through the first half of the 1990s, fuelled by large 
capital inflows. This time, however, it was dominated by private flows, i.e., foreign direct 
investment and portfolio investment, including corporate sector borrowing (mainly from 
banks). The government and public sector external debt remained stable, and the 
government also continued its conservative approach to managing the external debt. The 
story of capital flows during the 1990s is more a story of private flows and less of official 
flows, the discussion of which goes beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
All in all, it may be said that in the 30 years since the initial sovereign debt crisis, the 
country faced numerous economic shocks, which policymakers handled without sinking 
                                                 
9  This was addressed in part in September 1989, when the managed float was restricted only to certain 
transactions undertaken at certain times of the day and an inter-bank free rate was allowed to govern all 
other transactions.  
10 Actually, the phenomenon of capital outflow was already detected in late 1989, but it became more 
substantial in 1990. 
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back into sovereign debt crises. In the period, the economy was gradually liberalized and 
foreign investors played an increasing role, both in domestic financial institutions and as 
a source of external funds for private sector borrowing. The 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
however, exposed how fragile the financial sector had become. As we shall see, the 
government stepped in to help minimize the private sector crisis, with unfortunate 




3. THE GOVERNMENT TAKES ON A NEW DEBT BURDEN 
 
Although Indonesia initially appeared to be in a strong position as the Asian financial 
crisis unfolded, the exodus of foreign finance from South-East Asia soon affected it too. 
The currency fell precipitously during the summer of 1997.11 By October 1997 the 
government was unable to defend the managed-floating system, and asked the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help. While a substantial financial assistance 
package was ultimately mobilized and Paris Club relief was arranged in a series of 
agreements,12 a number of inopportune policy measures were first undertaken at the 
IMF’s urging. 
 
For example, one early policy response advocated by the IMF was the liquidation of 16 
weak private banks. With no deposit insurance system in place, the bank closure in 
November 1997 caused widespread panic. Depositors shifted their assets to state and 
foreign banks.13 At the same time, panic and fears over the fluctuating value of the 
currency caused a substantial currency substitution. As people withdrew their domestic 
deposits and converted them into foreign currency or placed them in safer banks, many 
domestic private banks suffered from a liquidity crunch, resulting in skyrocketing inter-
bank rates.14  
 
Meanwhile, as the 'lender of last resort,' the central bank injected liquidity funds known 
as Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia (BLBI) to a number of private banks. By the end 
of 1997 the injected amount swelled to 7 percent of GDP, while the exchange rate 
weakened further. Worse, recipient banks did not properly use most of the funds.  Some 
were gambled away in the foreign exchange or securities markets; some were used by 
banks to increase operations, staff, branches, and services; and some funds were simply 
transferred into bank owners’ accounts abroad or lent recklessly to businesses in the 
banks’ own group and would become non-performing loans (NPL).15  While 
conceptually, BLBI represents a standard form of liquidity support to illiquid but not 
insolvent banks, the actual implementation was seriously flawed.  In some cases the 
                                                 
11 The managed float was maintained in the 1990s up to that point, with the rupiah depreciating 3-5% per 
year during 1989-95, albeit with increasing ranges allowed around the central rate. This ended in August 
1997, when the currency began to float freely. The widening of the band had been a response to difficulties 
in managing the monetary consequences of capital flows, while the moving peg policy sought to maintain a 
stable real effective exchange rate for trade purposes (see Azis, 2006, pp. 184-8). 
12 Paris Club agreements were signed on September 23, 1998, April 13, 2000 and April 12, 2002, the latter 
applying “Houston terms.” Following the massive tsunami, debt payments were also deferred in 2005 (for 
details, see the website of the Paris Club at www.clubdeparis.org).  
13 By January 1998, the state banks regained their earlier dominance in terms of total deposit share in the 
country, which they had lost following the late 1980s policy liberalization. 
14  The market segmentation that characterized Indonesia’s financial sector is evident from the following: 
among small and medium sized banks, the average inter-bank rates for overnight funds increased from 35 
to 57 percent in November 1997, while the rates among the prime banks decreased from 30 to 18 percent 
(Enoch, Baldwin, Frecaut and Kovanen, 2001).  
15  According to a report by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), as much as 96 percent of the extended 
BLBI were potential government losses (non-repaid borrowing). 
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central bank even extended credit in amounts exceeding the recipient banks’ total 
assets.16  
 
The IMF’s prescription also included tightening the fiscal budget and raising interest 
rates to very high levels. These policies, however, failed to restore market confidence. On 
the contrary, social uprisings flared and company bankruptcies rose. The latter damaged 
the balance sheets of many banks, causing them to suffer a negative net-worth. Indeed, 
much of the country’s financial sector and large corporate businesses at the time either 
collapsed or were on the brink of collapse. The negative equity capital of the banking 
sector worsened quickly. By March 1999, the figure reached minus Rp 245 trillion, or 
over US$31 billion. The external financial crisis had become a domestic banking crisis. 
 
Upon the recommendations of the World Bank and the IMF, the government sought to 
rescue the banking system through a blanket guarantee program. The government directly 
covered the deposits in closed banks and indirectly those in the banks that were judged 
able to remain open by recapitalizing those banks. In the latter case, the government took 
over a huge volume of problem loans of the banks in exchange for “recap bonds” 
(estimated at Rp 405 trillion). The bonds were given to the troubled banks according to 
certain criteria, such as the bank’s initial capital adequacy ratio (CAR). The program was 
managed by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), created in 1998 to last 5 
years, which immediately put 50 private and 4 state banks under its surveillance. The 
intention was to reform, restructure and privatize those that could be salvaged, recouping 
as much as possible of the government money put into the institutions, and to close down 
the rest.17  
 
Moreover, the BLBI loans were transferred from the central bank to the government, in 
exchange for which the government issued bonds to the central bank (they amounted to 
Rp 220 trillion).18  The net effect was to raise the government’s debt by the amount of 
bonds issued to the banks and the central bank in exchange for the non-performing loans 
and BLBI loans, respectively, as well as by that part of the government’s other borrowing 
that was required to compensate the depositors of the closed banks (roughly another Rp 
74 trillion).19  
 
In addition to the recap and other bonds discussed above, the government issued T-bonds 
                                                 
16  Instead of applying the government’s bank guarantee mechanism introduced in January 1998, Bank 
Indonesia continued to allow banks to obtain BLBI funds through a “clearing” mechanism. From the 
recipient bank’s point of view this was a much more convenient way since the borrowing process could be 
done with much less paper work, more lenient conditions and little scrutiny. 
17 See Pangestu (2003) for a detailed discussion. 
18  The shift of BLBI burden from the central bank to government was far from easy, especially because the 
precise amount had not been agreed upon by the two parties. It took long and arduous negotiations that 
lasted until late 2003 for the government and the central bank to finally reach an agreement regarding the 
BLBI settlement and the financial relations between them.  
19 The government also took contingent responsibility — in the sense of issuing guarantees — for external 
inter-bank loans under a London Club arrangement in June 1998 that established a framework to deal with 
Indonesian bank and corporate foreign debt (data of World Bank).  
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to cover the fiscal budget deficit, with maturities that ranged from 7 to 10 years and with 
fixed interest rates at around 10 to 14.5 percent. By the end of 2002, Rp 28 trillion of 
these bonds were outstanding. Dollar-denominated bonds were also issued (US$1 billion) 
to help finance the budget deficit. Meanwhile, official foreign lending to Indonesia also 
increased since the 1997 crisis. It comprised loans made through the Consultative Group 
on Indonesia, by the IMF and other international financial institutions, and loans made 
through bilateral arrangements.20 
 
Overall, from 1998 to 2000, total government debt, foreign and domestic, rose from 46 to 
98 percent of GDP (figure 1). Total debt servicing (interest plus principal) peaked at over 
7.3 percent of GDP in 2001. Figure 2 shows the sudden and dramatic increase in interest 
payments on domestic government debt. This component was virtually zero prior to 
2000. The interest payment peaked at more than 4% of GDP in 2001. Meanwhile, the 
government began to repay the principal of some of these debts in 2002.  
 
 




 Source: Processed from the Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Finance 
 
 
The whole premise of the recap policy was that the banks would resume their normal 
intermediation function and lend to the economy. In practice, this did not happen. Banks 
preferred to hold government bonds and central bank securities (SBIs or Sertifikat Bank 
Indonesia), which gave them no-risk income, while also securing them a higher CAR 
than had they extended more loans. Thus, the intended outcome of the policy did not 
materialize, while the costs were enormous. The recap program put substantial pressure 
on the government budget and the volume of bonds issued in conjunction with the 
blanket guarantee program was very large.  
 
                                                 
20 The Paris Club arrangements noted earlier did not reduce the stock of debt, but postponed repayments. 
Government bonds (dom debt) 
Official foreign debt 
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Source: Indonesian Government budget, various years 
 
 
By 2002, 45 percent of government total revenue was spent on debt servicing (Figure 3). 
To put this in perspective, while in 1997/98 total debt servicing was still below the total 
amount of development expenditures, since 2000 debt repayment has been always higher 
than development expenditures; and this gap has persistently widened.21 By 2004 the size 
















                                                 
21 Up to 2004, the government expenditure recorded in the official budget had been classified into routine 
(current), development, and regional balance funds. Beginning in 2005 no distinction is made between 






















Realizing the mounting fiscal burden and that it emanated largely from the bank bailout 
policy, the government took a number of steps to ease it, including the following:  
 
(1) Buy-back program, as planned, in which the government used the 
proceeds from privatization and asset sales by IBRA to re-purchase 
some of the non-matured bonds. This redemption scheme was 
exercised in 2003, when banks and securities companies that held 
recap bonds sold back some of them at higher than the original prices;  
 
(2) Re-profiling debt in line with the policy goal of adding longer term 
issues to the secondary market and the limited capacity of government 
to create a surplus in the short run in the primary balance. The way this 
was carried out was to first determine each bank’s liquidity 
requirement, and then the government exchanged the bank’s holdings 
of bonds above that level for new bonds that had a longer maturity. 
However, this scheme applied only to banks that were still in the 
public sector, prior to divestment; 
 
(3) Debt-switching which was intended to lengthen the maturity profile of 
the debt. The main difference between this approach and the re-
profiling scheme is that the terms of the bond exchanges were 
















(4) Refinancing matured bonds by issuing new bonds; and  
 
(5) Reducing government’s contingent liabilities by phasing-out the 
blanket guarantee program and in other ways. This was to accompany 
an improving health of the banking sector and strengthened 
macroeconomic stability that would enable interest rates to decline.  
 
With the above schemes, it was expected that the cost of refinancing would become more 
manageable without putting too much pressure on the government budget. As regards the 
relative size of the different schemes, re-profiling has been the most significant (for 
example, at the early stage of the program the value of bonds held by one state-bank 
alone, Bank Mandiri, amounted to Rp 130 trillion). Figure 4 shows how the burden of 
domestic debt repayment has been spread out (re-profiled) by these policies.  
 
 
Figure 4. Scheduled Amortization of Tradable Government Bonds  
 (before and after 2003 re-profiling)  
 
 
 Source: Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Finance 
 
 
These delayed-payment policies, while importantly buying time, imposed costs that 
potentially affected fiscal sustainability in later years. Not only did they prolong the 
period of repayment of both interest and principal, but as investors had perceived the 
government’s inability to repay they demanded higher risk premiums on the debt-
switching and rolled over bonds that were sold to the public. In all, this policy would 
raise the net supply of government securities outstanding in outer years, raising the debt-
14 
 
servicing burden in those years.  
 
While the reprofiling exercise thus ameliorated a looming repayment difficulty, the 
country still had to live with the high opportunity cost of the initial bank bailout policy. It 
had captured the fiscal space that might have been used otherwise to stimulate economic 
recovery. Indeed, the government ran a tight fiscal position. The government managed to 
secure fiscal sustainability by maintaining a positive primary balance. As shown in 
Figure 3, since 2000 the primary balance has been in surplus between 2 and 4 percent of 
GDP. Furthermore, the total budget deficit has been reduced from 3.6 percent of GDP in 
2001 to 1.8 percent in 2003.  
 
Another adverse consequence of the bank bailout policy could be seen in the financial 
sector. The misuse of funds by the banks was not the only drawback of extending a huge 
amount of BLBI. Such direct cash transfers also instantly raised the money supply, 
contributing to higher inflation and further weakening the exchange rate. This 
development worsened investors’ confidence, thus dampening the effects of any efforts to 
recover the economy from the crisis.22Although no immediate cash transfers were 
involved in the case of the recap bond, the possibility of recipient banks becoming 
excessively risk-averse was high, as many episodes of post-banking crises around the 
world has taught us. As noted earlier, banks preferred to hold non-risky government 
bonds rather than to issue credits to the private sector, hurting the intermediation 
function. As a result, investment did not pick up, slowing the recovery process.  
 
                                                 
22 Moreover, the high interest rate policy imposed by the IMF at the beginning of the crisis also had failed 
to restore confidence. It further dampened the economy and caused more problems to the banking sector as 
the bankruptcy rate rose. 
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4. COUNTERFACTUAL POLICY SCENARIOS FOR INDONESIA’S 
CRISIS WORKOUT 
 
The fiscal consequences outlined above and the banks’ failure to fully resume 
commercial bank intermediation suggests that the bank recapitalization program in 
Indonesia has not worked well.23 The country built up a debt burden, but the extra 
borrowing did not generate growth necessary to give the country the ability to repay the 
debt in the future.  
 
Thus, it is of interest to ask whether there was an alternative and whether the whole bail 
out and recovery program was poorly structured. More specifically, one may ask whether 
there was an excessive bail-out in terms of both BLBI (given the potential misuse and 
macroeconomic consequences of it) and recap bonds (given the costly terms of the 
bonds). Also, it is necessary to evaluate the outcome in a broader context than narrow 
debt sustainability indicators. In addition to the question of securing fiscal sustainability, 
one has to ask what happened to the exchange rate, GDP growth, unemployment and 
poverty. 
 
In other words, what would have happened if some of the enormous amount of resources 
used for the program was instead allocated to other uses that were more growth 
stimulating? In this section, some alternative policies are discussed by using a fairly 
comprehensive model capable of capturing the general equilibrium effects of those 
policies. That is, counterfactual scenarios are explored in which fewer resources are used 
for the bail-out program and other government expenditures are assumed increased 
instead. Concerns about growth and poverty helped shape the specification of the 
alternative uses of government funds. Also, given the fact that many donors pledged a 
relatively large amount of concessional loans following the crisis, it is reasonable to 
assume that additional budget expenditures could have been easily financed through such 
external loans. The problem during the time was not a lack of (official) loans, but the 
pressure from the IMF to avoid any fiscal expansion.24    In other words, the scenarios 
entail less domestic debt for the bank bailout and more foreign official (and concessional) 
debt for the fiscal stimulus. 
 
Two developments motivated the counterfactual analysis: (1) Failures of the bank 
recapitalization program to adequately restore financial intermediation by banks and 
negative repercussions of BLBI; (2) Indonesia’s disappointing growth performance 
during the post-crisis years. The proposed counterfactual policies are specifically 
designed to stimulate more economic growth by shifting some of the resources used for 
BLBI or recap bonds to alternative uses. The question the model seeks to answer is how 
                                                 
23 Since the implementation of the program, the loan/deposit ratio has continued to be far below the pre-
crisis level.  
24 As an illustration, by July 1998 the total donor pledge was US$7.9 billion (US$3 billion from the World 
Bank). This was outside the bilateral loans pledged by numerous countries. It was the foreign private 
money that quickly dried up during the time. It is also important to re-emphasize what has been argued in 
the text earlier, i.e., that in general Indonesia had done well in managing its official loans.   
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much more growth might have been obtained and with what indirect consequences.  
 
The financial general equilibrium model (FCGE) employed in the analysis captures the 
intricate links between financial and real sectors. Each agent, including banks, the central 
bank, government and households, has its own balance sheet and each can enter into 
international as well as domestic transactions. The use of a detailed classification of 
economic agents, including different categories of households, and the endogenous price 
features of the model allow one to extend the analysis to include the impact on the 
distribution of income, and to some extent also the poverty impact of different policies 
(see Azis, 2001, 2002 and 2006a and Azis et al., 2004, for detailed descriptions of the 
model). 
 
The baseline scenario is meant to capture the essence of what actually transpired, against 
which simulated alternatives are compared.  The baseline thus includes a dramatic 
increase of BLBI, which is captured as augmented liabilities in the consolidated 
commercial banks’ balance sheet. However, this is not matched by an increase in banks’ 
credit. Instead, SBI holding rose (see the earlier discussions). When credit actually 
increased, it was lent recklessly to businesses in the banks’ own group, potentially raises 
the non-performing loans (NPL).25  On recap bonds in the baseline scenario, the amount 
increased gradually to reach Rp600 trillion by the end of 1998. By carefully specifying 
the trend of these developments, the model is capable of generating a baseline run that 
comes close to the true values. This baseline run covers the years 1998-2002, the primary 
years for post-crisis recovery. The baseline is then compared with the following 
counterfactual scenarios: (1) Targeted budget stimulus with a smaller amount of BLBI 
liquidity support to the banks; and (2) Targeted budget stimulus with a smaller amount of 
recap bonds.26  
 
4.1. Targeted Expenditure Stimulus with Less BLBI 
 
In this simulation, the government is to provide a budget expenditure stimulus of Rp 40 
trillion in 1998, targeted to five sectors.27 Particular attention is given to the agricultural 
sector, which receives the largest stimulus. This sector is affected directly through 
investment in infrastructure, and indirectly through an improvement in the sector’s 
productivity. In the model, such public investment would attract (crowd-in) private 
investment, causing an increase in the demand for bank loans. At the same time, it is 
assumed that the amount of BLBI extended to the banking sector in 1998 would have 
been Rp 40 trillion less (around 27 percent of the actual amount). Interestingly enough, 
although the commercial banks’ total liabilities are reduced by the reduced amount of 
BLBI, total bank loans and thus total credit increase owing to the greater demand for 
                                                 
25  According to the report by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), as much as 96 percent of the extended 
BLBI could potentially become a government loss (unpaid borrowing). In the model, bank credit is broken 
down into two categories: performing and non-performing loans (NPL). 
26 Full details of the scenario runs are available from the author. 
27  Food (Rp20 trillion), Non-food Agriculture (Rp10 trillion), Transport (Rp8 trillion), Construction (Rp1 
trillion), and Trade (Rp1 trillion). 
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credit as noted. The ratio of non-performing loans to total credit is assumed fixed, which 
then implies that the magnitude of NPL increases.28 The increased bank lending is in lieu 
of reduced SBI holdings. As a result, the ratio of credit to SBI increases by more than in 
the baseline up to 2002, the last year of the scenario run. 
 
Under this scenario, GDP and investment would have been higher than in the baseline, 
and the value added of the agricultural sector is also higher in each year in the scenario 
(Figure 5). This is particularly important to note since the policy stimulus occurred only 
in 1998 (a one time impulse) and yet the favorable impact seems to last for several years. 
The resulting agriculture/GDP ratio is generally higher throughout the simulation period 
(figure 6). Most importantly, the unemployment rate would have been lower than in the 
baseline all the way up 2002. Employment creation occurs not only in agricultural 
activities but also in the off-farm sector.  
 
 
Figure 5. Agricultural Value Added, GDP and Price of Poverty Line:  
 Budget Stimulus with Less BLBI 




Notes:  1.Vertical axis shows the index for each variable, where the pre-crisis year (1995) = 1.0. 
 2. AgVA = agricultural value added; PQPL = price of poverty line (price index for basic goods). 










                                                 
28  This is possibly an extreme assumption as the ratio of nonperforming loans to total credit could fall 
when BLBI is reduced, since most of the BLBI ended up as NPL. 
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Figure 6. Relative Income of Poor Agricultural Households and Agricultural  





Notes:  1. Vertical axis shows the ratio for each variable. 
2. “agHH” and “allHH” refer to incomes of agricultural and total households, respectively; AGVA is the 
agricultural sector  value added.  
 3. BASE = baseline scenario; SIM = policy scenario result 
 
 
The equity of the banks in the initial year (1998) is lower under this scenario, as it 
receives less BLBI funding, which increases the risk premium on interest and loan rates. 
But lower-than-baseline bank wealth occurs only in the policy stimulus year, owing to the 
greater economic growth, and the risk premium is higher only in the short run. Yet, the 
loan rate is higher all the way until 2002, implying that factors other than risk tend to 
influence the rate. Obviously, a higher loan rate could reduce investment in some sectors. 
But as indicated above, the overall GDP is higher. Given the fact that private investment 
is specified as a function of not only the loan rate but also the level of economic activity, 
overall private investment remains higher than in the baseline. In general, therefore, there 
is a crowding-in process. Higher bank wealth after 1998 puts banks in a better position to 
extend credit. This is the reason why despite the decrease in the liability item associated 
with BLBI, bank credit tends to rise, lowering the SBI/credit ratio. On the monetary side, 
reserve money will surge.  
 
What is the cost of this counterfactual policy? In the short-run, government deficits 
would rise because there is a time lag before tax revenues catch up with the fiscal 
stimulus. The simulation results indicate that, after starting out larger than the baseline, 
the scenario deficit reaches 2.5 percent of GDP, which is slightly lower than in the 
baseline (2.6 percent). Hence, the expansionary budget would have raised the 
deficit/GDP ratio only in the initial year. The incremental deficit would mostly financed 
by foreign borrowing from official sources.  Since the risk premium in the model depends 
in part on foreign borrowing, this premium is higher than in the baseline scenario in 1998 





In the stimulus year, prices tend to be higher compared to the baseline and lower 
thereafter. Increased demand for intermediate inputs due to increased public investment 
leads to higher prices of intermediate inputs in almost all sectors compared to the 
baseline. The only exceptions are prices in the non-food agricultural sector. These higher 
prices of inputs prompt higher output prices in most sectors except in the agricultural-
related activities, i.e., food, non-food and the food processing industries. The average 
price level measured by the weighted price of output or the consumer price index or GDP 
deflator is higher only in 1998. This is consistent with the trend of base money. However, 
since the share of food and non-food agricultural goods in the “price of poverty” line is 
relatively large, the declining price of output in these sectors contributes to a lower-than-
baseline “price of poverty” line (Figure 5).29  
 
Incomes of all poor households declined in 1999 (as in the baseline) and then increased 
towards 2002. The poverty line price fluctuates in a similar manner. However, the price 
of poverty line is lower in each year in the simulation than in the baseline, suggesting that 
there would be less poverty.30 The income disparity is in general more favorable than in 
the baseline.  
 
Further evidence is that the ratio of the total income of the four poorest household groups 
to the total income of all household groups is higher in the scenario up to 2001. 
Moreover, the ratio of total income of the agricultural poor households (small farmers 
and agricultural employees; hereafter the “poor-2”) to total income of all the poor 
households (poor-2 plus the urban and rural non-agricultural poor) is also higher all the 
way up to 2002.  This suggests that the counterfactual policy to switch from BLBI to 
government expenditure would help agricultural households relatively more than other 
household groups both in real terms and as a share of GDP.  This is confirmed in Figure 
6, which shows the rising share of agricultural value added to GDP and also the improved 
relative position of agricultural households (the poor-2) under the current scenario as 
compared to the baseline.  
  
4.2. Targeted Expenditure Stimulus and Fewer Recap Bonds  
 
In this second simulation, government increases its 1998 budget spending to the same 
five sectors exactly as described above. At the same time, however, it issues an 
equivalent smaller amount of recap bonds (thus the recap bonds are reduced by Rp 40 
trillion). This policy has mixed effects on the risk premiums. The reduction in bank 
wealth due to the fall in recap bonds increases risk and loan rates in the subsequent year.  
On the other hand, since risk is also affected by public and private borrowing from 
abroad, the decline of the latter tends to reduce risk. On balance, except in 1998, the risk 
premium turns out always lower than in the baseline, as in the first scenario.   
 
                                                 
29  Poverty line income is defined as the required quantity of basic consumption goods times the price of 
those basic goods. The “price of poverty” line refers to an index of the latter.    
30  Until one has the data on the intra-group distribution of income it is not possible to be certain about the 
precise trend of poverty. 
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The composition of banks’ balance sheets also changes.  On the asset side they hold less 
SBI and recap bonds and issue more loans. On the liability side they have less capital and 
less foreign borrowing. The deviations of the loan/SBI ratio from the baseline are 
smaller, meaning that the growth of lending would not have been as high as under the 
preceding scenario.  Indeed, the direct effect on bank balance sheets of reducing recap 
bonds is more severe than in the case of cutting BLBI. In contrast to the latter, assuming 
a lower level of recap bonds also leaves more NPL on the banks’ books, which causes 
bank wealth to be persistently lower than in the baseline, affecting bank capacity to lend 
(for the details of the model’s transmission of mechanism see Azis et.al., 2004). Hence, 
although lending increases and SBI holdings decline, the lending/SBI ratio would not 
have been higher than in the preceding scenario. This also explains why the resulting 
reserve money and price level are not as high.  
 
GDP, investment, and agricultural value added are higher than in the baseline. The 
unemployment rate is lower, and the share of agricultural value added in total GDP is 
higher.  The price level is higher in the stimulus year, lower thereafter. The price of 
poverty line is lower throughout the period (Figure 7) and for much the same reason 
discussed in the earlier scenario. Also, the price of poverty line ends up 3.6 percent lower 
in 2002 than in 1998 (compared to a fall of only 1.1 percent in this time period in the first 
scenario). However, the total incomes of the four poorest socioeconomic groups fall 4.1 
percent between 1998 and 2002 and so the trend in poverty incidence during the scenario 
cannot be conclusively determined (nor could it in the first scenario). Nevertheless, the 
income distribution throughout the scenario is less unequal than in the baseline. As in the 
preceding scenario, poor agricultural households seem to benefit relatively more than 
non-agricultural households.  This is seen by the higher-than-baseline ratio of incomes of 
the two poorest groups over incomes of all households (Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 7. Agricultural Value Added, GDP and Price of Poverty Line: 




Notes:  1.Vertical axis shows the index for each variable, where the pre-crisis year (1995) = 1.0. 
 2. AgVA = agricultural value added; PQPL = price of poverty line (price index for basic goods). 
 3. BASE = baseline scenario; SIM = policy scenario result 
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 Figure 8. Relative Position of Poor Agricultural Households and 





Notes:  1. Vertical axis shows the ratio for each variable. 
 2. “agHH” and “allHH” refer to incomes of agricultural and total households, respectively; AGVA is the  
                    agricultural sector  value added.  
 3. BASE = baseline scenario; SIM = policy scenario result 
 
 
The fluctuations in the government deficit are similar to those in the preceding scenario. 
Again much of the increase is financed by government borrowing from abroad. The 
deficit/GDP ratio increases from less than 1 percent in 1997, the last pre-scenario year, to 
4.8 percent in 1998, then decreases to 2.7 percent and 1.6 percent in 1999 and 2000, and 
increases again to 2.6 percent in 2001 and 2002. This suggests that expanding budgetary 
expenditures, providing it is targeted to the right sectors, combined with equivalently 
reducing the amount of recap bonds would have been effective in stimulating the 
economy without causing a large budget deficit. 
 
Increased government borrowing from abroad would tend to raise the risk premium, 
causing private capital inflows to decline and the exchange rate to depreciate, both of 
which would raise inflation. But as discussed earlier, banks end up borrowing less from 
abroad, more than offsetting the effect of government borrowing on risk. Consequently, 
the net effect is that the exchange rate tends to appreciate.  
 
In sum, the counterfactual policy simulations reveal that the alternative policies of 
smaller 1998 issues of BLBI or recap bonds (the two items that make up the bulk of 
Indonesia’s sovereign debt) in exchange for larger spending on specific economic sectors 
would have yielded better socio-economic outcomes than the policy actually followed, as 
modeled in the baseline run. More importantly, these alternatives could have been 
achieved without putting fiscal and macroeconomic stability at risk. Moreover, given the 
fact that most BLBI funds were misused, and the distribution of recap bonds was 
subjectively decided by the government, there is no reason to believe that the condition of 
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the banking sector would have been worse under the counterfactual scenarios. Even if 
more banks had been closed down as a consequence, the banking sector’s health would 






The policy of providing liquidity supports and issuing a massive amount of government 
bonds through the bank recapitalization program during the 1997-98 crisis dramatically 
changed the structure and dynamics of Indonesia’s sovereign debt. Virtually none prior to 
the crisis, domestic debt escalated since 1999 such that it became more than half of total 
debt. The adverse repercussions of the policy turned out to be more than just putting 
pressures on the government’s fiscal position. When the rescued banks found themselves 
freed of non-performing loans and instead holding non-risky government bonds, they 
declined to extend as much new credit to the private sector as they might have, making 
Indonesia’s economic recovery the slowest among the Asian crisis countries. While the 
costs of the program are enormous, the intended benefits are hardly seen.  
 
Considering the institutional constraints that should have been foreseen, and putting the 
issue of getting to debt and fiscal sustainability in a broader context by looking at what 
happens with other socio-economic indicators (e.g., GDP growth, exchange rate, 
unemployment, poverty, etc), the bank rescue operations in Indonesia were over 
financed, poorly structured, and went overboard for the banks at the expense of the 
economy. Promoting growth via fiscal stimulus should have been part of the debt 
management program because the higher income that would have resulted would have 
itself helped improve the future debt position and the government’s repayment capacity.            
 
Given the difficulty of rescuing the banking sector in a financial crisis, and the serious 
repercussions of policy mistakes, one important policy lesson is that a greater emphasis 
ought to be given to the crisis prevention policies. A proper oversight of the banking 
sector is important, but so is the policy to insulate the public sector from problems in the 
private banks. The government must be always wary of how large an issue of recap bonds 
is needed when confronted with a banking crisis. If the crisis inevitably occurs, a counter-
cyclical fiscal policy should be part of the overall debt management. Finally, as well as 
the level of foreign currency obligations, it is also clear from this case that the volume of 
domestic debt matters, both in terms of fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic 
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